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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Did the trial court err in dismissing Mr. 
Brunson's claims against the Recontrust 
Defendants' by order dated August 13, 2010? 
Standard of review: "A trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." State v. Bernert, 2004 UT App.321, P 6, 100 P.3d 221 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 2004) (quoting State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, P 10, 17 P.3d 1145 
(2001)). 
Answer: The trial court did not err in dismissing Mr. Brunson's claims 
against the Recontrust Defendants or its subsequent orders dismissing Mr. 
Brunson's claims against Green Tree. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Green Tree is the servicer of a loan that has been the subject of no 
fewer than three different wrongful foreclosure lawsuits initiated by plaintiff 
Deron Brunson. The case underlying this appeal was Mr. Brunson's second 
attempt to avoid the consequences of failing to repay a loan in excess of 
$1,000,000.00. His complaint asserted claims for wrongful foreclosure (First 
Cause of Action) and declaratory judgment (Second Cause of Action) against 
co-defendants and appellees The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of 
New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWALT, Inc; Alternative 
Loan Trust 2005-58 Mortgage and Recontrust Company, N.A. (the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Recontrust Defendants") as well as quantum meruit (Third Cause of Action) 
against all defendants-appellees. (R. 1-13) 
By order dated August 13, 2010, the district court dismissed with 
prejudice Mr. Brunson's claims against the Recontrust Defendants. The court 
found that the underlying action was barred by both claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion, was frivolous and without merit, and was not brought in 
good faith in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. Subsequently, Green 
Tree's own motion to dismiss Mr. Brunson's complaint was also granted. (R. 
670). Although Mr. Brunson appealed the August 13, 2010 order, he has not 
appealed dismissal of the claims against Green Tree. 
STATEMENT O F FACTS 
1. On or about August 8, 2005 Mr. Brunson took a loan secured by 
real property at 14772 S. Golden Leaf Court (the "Property' and the "Loan"). 
(R. 1-13 at t t 1, 13). 
2. Green Tree acquired Mr. Brunson's Loan from National City 
Bank on July 1, 2009 and became the servicer of the Loan. See Exhibit J to 
Verified Complaint (R. 54-59). 
3. When Mr. Brunson failed to fulfill his payment obligations under 
the terms of the Loan, defendant-appellee Recontrust Company, N.A. 
("Recontrust") as trustee of the t rust deed securing the Loan began non-
judicial foreclosure efforts in early 2009. 
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4. On or about June 3, 2009, plaintiff sued Recontrust and 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide") seeking, among other things, 
damages against Recontrust due to alleged wrongful foreclosure. Devon 
Brunson v. ReconTrust Company, NA. et al9 In the Third Judicial District for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, Case No. 90909512. (R. 156-162, H 3-16). 
5. In that case, Judge Kennedy granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss, and flatly told Brunson that the allegations contained in the Lawsuit 
were "frivolous." Judge Kennedy entered an order dismissing Brunson's 
Amended Complaint with prejudice. (R. 158, f^ 9). 
6. Plaintiff appealed that ruling, which the Utah Court of Appeals 
upheld. Brunson v. Recontrust Co., NA., 2009 UT App 381 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009). Plaintiffs petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was 
denied on April 22, 2010. (R. 158, HI 10-12). 
7. On July 20, 2010, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking among other 
things a declaration that the defendants had no interest in the Property and 
therefore could not foreclose. He also sought damages in amounts similar to 
those sought in the previous action. (R. 159-60, f f 17-24). 
8. On the same day, Mr. Brunson also filed an emergency motion for 
a temporary restraining order to halt Recontrust's foreclosure efforts. (R. 78-
95). 
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9. The Recontrust Defendants moved to dismiss on July 26, 2010, 
arguing that Mr. Brunson's claims were barred by both issue preclusion and 
claim preclusion due to the fact that they were raised or should have been 
raised in the previous case before Judge Kennedy. (R. 96-108). 
10. Green Tree had not yet been served with Mr. Brunson's pleadings 
when the Recontrust Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, (see R. 520), 
and therefore, did not join in the motion. 
11. At oral argument on July 27, 2010—less than a week after Green 
Tree had been served and before Green Tree had an opportunity to respond— 
the district court denied plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order 
and granted the Recontrust Defendants' motion to dismiss. In a minute 
entry, the court told Mr. Brunson, "This case is going to be dismissed as well 
and you're advised not to file again." (R. 672, p. 15). The court also granted 
the Recontrust Defendants' request for attorneys' fees in light of Mr. 
Brunson's "frivolous lawsuit." (R. 672, p. 16). 
12. In an order dated August 13, 2010 (the "Appealed Order"), the 
Court dismissed Mr. Brunson's claims against the Recontrust Defendants 
with prejudice. The Court also awarded the Recontrust Defendants their 
attorneys fees because Mr. Brunson's claims were "frivolous, without merit 
and not brought in good faith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825." 
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Finally, the Court ordered, "Plaintiff is not to refile this case anew/' (R. 156-
61). 
13. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the August 13, 2010 
order. (R. 168-69). By order dated December 16, 2010, the Utah Court of 
Appeals dismissed Mr. Brunson's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (R. 186-88). 
14. In the interim, in June of 2011, Mr. Brunson commenced yet 
another lawsuit, seeking again to prevent anyone from foreclosing on either 
of the properties at issue. See Brunson v. American Home Mortgage 
Servicing, Inc. et a/., Case No. 110915040. By Order dated November 17, 
2011, the district court, Hon. Sandra N. Peuler, dismissed plaintiffs claims, 
stating that "[r]es judicata bars all claims asserted by Mr. Brunson against 
the Moving Defendants and dismisses all claims against the Moving 
Defendants, with prejudice." 
15. Subsequently, Mr. Brunson obtained a default judgment against 
Green Tree. (R. 197-216). Green Tree moved to vacate the default as 
procedurally improper, (R. 217-382), and by order dated November 3, 2011 
the district court requested supplemental briefing on Green Tree's motion. (R. 
424-25). 
16. Following supplemental briefing on Green Tree's motion to 
vacate, (see R.428- 549), the district court granted Green Tree's motion to 
vacate the procedurally improper default. (R. 550). 
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17. By motion dated January 25, 2012, Green Tree moved to dismiss 
the claims asserted against it in Mr. Brunson's verified complaint. Mr. 
Brunson opposed the motion. (See R. 554-662). 
18. By minute entry dated February 24, 2012, the district court (Hon. 
Paul G. Maughan) granted Green Tree's motion to dismiss. (R. 670). 
19. Mr. Brunson has not appealed the dismissal of his claims against 
Green Tree. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As set forth in Point LA below, Mr. Brunson has not appealed the order 
dismissing his claims against defendant-appellee Green Tree. Accordingly, 
the resolution of this appeal should have no effect on the status of those 
claims, which the district court properly dismissed. 
As set forth in Point LB below, the district court acted within its 
discretion and did not err in dismissing Mr. Brunson's claims against the 
Recontrust Defendants. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY 
DISMISSED MR. BRUNSON'S COMPLAINT 
A. Reversal of the Appealed Order Would Not Disturb Mr. Brunson's 
Claims Against Green Tree, Which Were Properly Dismissed 
Mr. Brunson has not challenged dismissal of his Third Cause of Action 
against Green Tree. Thus, even if the Court determines—which it should 
not—that the district court improperly dismissed Mr. Brunson's claims 
against the ReconTrust Defendants, it would not revive his claims against 
Green Tree. 
The only grounds Mr. Brunson identifies for reversing the Appealed 
Order is that the ReconTrust Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted 
before it was fully briefed and submitted for decision. Brunson Brief at 6-9. 
That is not the case with Green Tree's motion to dismiss, however, which was 
granted after it was fully briefed and submitted for decision. (R. 554-662). 
Accordingly, there is no basis for disturbing the district court's dismissal of 
Mr. Brunson's causes of action against Green Tree. 
B. The District Court Had Discretion to Dismiss Claims Barred by 
Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion Regardless of Whether a 
Request to Submit was Filed Pursuant to UTAHR. ClV. P. 7(d) 
Mr. Brunson argues on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing 
his complaint against the Recontrust Defendants because the motion had not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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been submitted for decision pursuant to Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Opening Brief of Appellant and Demand for Transparency 
dated April 9, 2012 ("Brunson Brief') at 7-8. Mr. Brunson claims he was thus 
deprived of due process, id. at 7-9, but offers no substantive reasons why 
dismissal should not have been granted. His argument has no support under 
Utah law. 
In Bolinder Co. v. Walker, 2010 UT App 363 (Ut. Ct. App., Dec. 16, 
2010),* this Court examined whether the absence of a Rule 7(d) request to 
submit for decision barred a court from deciding a pending motion. 
Determining tha t it did not, the court stated: 
Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does state that if 
no party files a request to submit a motion for decision, "the 
motion will not be submitted for decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d). 
This rule, in substance, was formerly located in the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, see Utah Code of Jud. Admin. 4-
501(1)(D) (repealed 2003) (stating, in pertinent part, "If neither 
party files a notice [to submit for decision], the motion will not be 
submitted for decision"). In interpreting that materially identical 
rule, this court squarely held in Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 
139, 980 P.2d 214, that "nothing in this rule or any other 
rule bars a court from deciding [a matter that is not 
submitted for decis ion] sua sponte." Id. f 11. 
Bolinder Co. v. Walker at *2-3. (emphasis added). The purpose of Rule 7(d) "is 
to bring order to the manner in which the courts operate. They are not 
intended to, nor do they, create or modify substantive rights of litigants, nor 
1
 A true and correct copy of this unpublished opinion is attached in the Appendix 
hereto. 
9 
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do they decrease the inherent power of the court to control matters pending 
before it." Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App. 139, *P12 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
Hartford Leasing Corp., 888 P.2d at 702 ("[a] trial judge is accorded broad 
discretion in determining how a [case] shall proceed in his or her 
courtroom.")) 
As set forth both in the Recontrust Defendants' and Green Tree's 
motions to dismiss,2 Mr. Brunson's complaint is barred by issue preclusion 
and claim preclusion. (R. 6-8; 562-64). He makes no attempt to show 
otherwise on appeal. He had ample opportunity to pursue all of his claims in 
his first lawsuit before Judge Kennedy (Third Dist. Case No. 90909512). 
Instead, he advanced the same frivolous claims—which arose out of the same 
transaction—against the same parties after they had been fully litigated. 
(e.g., R. 555-566). Because all of the elements of claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion were satisfied, id., and because his claims in any event are not 
cognizable under Utah law (R. 564-68), the district court did not err when it 
granted dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and as set forth in the brief of co-defendants 
and appellees the Recontrust Defendants, the district court did not err in 
2
 To the extent it is consistent with Green Tree's position, Green Tree joins in and 
incorporates the Recontrust Defendants' brief as if set forth fully herein. 
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dismissing Mr. Brunson's claims. Accordingly, defendant and appellee Green 
Tree Servicing, LLC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Appealed 
Order in its entirety. 
DATED: May 14, 2012 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY, P.C. 
Thomas T. Billings 
Mary Jane E. Galvin-Wagg 
Kelley M. Marsden 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on May 14, 2012 the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLEE GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC was served upon the 
following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
Deron Brunson 
138 East 12300 South, #C-1 
Draper, UT 84020 
Darren K. Nelson, Esq. 
Michael D. Black, Esq. 
John P. Snow, Esq. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 S. State Street, Ste. 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mary Jane E. Ga l^^5^gg . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 
24(f)(1) because this brief contains 1,855 words, excluding the parts of the 
brief exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1)(B). 
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 
27(b) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface 
using Microsoft Office Word 2003 in 13 point Century Schoolbook. 
DATED: May 14, 2012 
4823-4905-9599, v. 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 1 
fD LexisNexis4" 
15 of 32 DOCUMENTS 
Bolinder Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, Plaintiff, v. Steven K. Walker, Defen-
dant, Third-party Plaintiff, and Appellant, v. Russell Christensen dba Fineline De-
velopment, Third-party Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20091076-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2010 UTApp 363; 2010 Utah App. LEXIS 369 
December 16,2010, Filed 
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1I 
Third District, Tooele Department, 070301570. The 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod. 
COUNSEL: Sean N. Egan, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lant. 
Jaime D. Topham, Grantsville, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge. WE CONCUR: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Associate Presiding Judge, William 
A. Thorne Jr., Judge. 
OPINION BY: J. Frederic Voros Jr. 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VOROS, Judge: 
The trial court granted plaintiff Bolinder Company, 
Inc. summary judgment against defendant Steven K. 
Walker. It also granted third-party defendant Russell 
Christensen summary judgment against third-party plain-
tiff Walker. Walker sought relief from the latter judg-
ment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The trial court denied 
Walker's rule 60(b) motion, and Walker appeals. We 
affirm.' 
1 We have determined that M[t]he facts and legal 
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs 
and record and the decisional process would not 
be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. 
App. P. 29(a)(3). 
The portion of rule 60(b) relied upon by Walker au-
thorizes the trial court, "in the furtherance of justice," to 
relieve a party from a final judgment on the grounds of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." 
[*2| Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). We note at the outset that 
dispositions of "rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable 
to attack. We grant broad discretion to trial courts' rule 
60(b) rulings because most are equitable in nature, satu-
rated with facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamen-
tal principles of fairness that do not easily lend them-
selves to appellate review." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT92, 
1J7, 104 P.3d 1198. 
Walker advances four separate arguments on appeal. 
First, he contends that the trial court erred in denying 
rule 60(b) relief because the trial court granted Christen-
sen's motion for summary judgment notwithstanding the 
fact that Christensen had never formally submitted the 
motion for decision. Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure does state that if no party files a request to 
submit a motion for decision, "the motion will not be 
submitted for decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d). This rule, 
in substance, was formerly located in the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, see Utah Code of Jud. Admin. 
4-501(l)(D) (repealed 2003) (stating, in pertinent part, 
"If neither party files a notice [to submit for decision], 
the motion will not be submitted for decision"). In inter-
preting [*3| that materially identical rule, this court 
squarely held in Scott v. Majors, 1999 UTApp 139, 980 
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2010 UT App 363; 2010 Utah App. LEXIS 369, * 
P.2d 214, that "nothing in this rule or any other rule bars 
a court from deciding [a matter that is not submitted for 
decision] sua sponte." ld.\\\. The object of rule 7(d) is 
thus not to prevent the court from disposing of a fully 
briefed motion, but to alert the parties that they "may not 
assume that a matter will be presented to the judge for 
decision by the clerks' office unless a party notifies the 
clerk of the court that the matter is fully briefed . . . and 
ready for decision." Id. The trial court's actions here 
complied with applicable law as expressed in Scott and 
did not require rule 60(b) relief. 
Next, Walker argues that the trial court erred in de-
nying rule 60(b) relief because Christensen's summary 
judgment motion was never noticed for hearing by the 
court. However, Walker's rule 60(b) motion filed in the 
trial court did not cite this as a ground for relief. This 
claim of error is thus not preserved for appellate review. 
See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT41, ] 15, 164 P.3d 366 ("In 
order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way [*4] that the 
trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue" (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Nor does Walker offer 
any "grounds for seeking review of an issue not pre-
served in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B). 
Accordingly, we do not consider it further. 
Next, Walker contends that the trial court erred in 
denying rule 60(b) relief because neither counsel for 
Walker nor counsel for Christensen attended the hearing 
on Christensen's motion for summary judgment. 2 As 
noted above, "We grant broad discretion to trial courts' 
rule 60(b) rulings." Fisher, 2004 UT 92, ] 7, 104 P3d 
1198. We acknowledge that when counsel for Walker 
and Christensen failed to appear, the trial court might 
have taken a more measured approach, continuing the 
summary judgment hearing and perhaps assessing attor-
ney fees against counsel. See Paulos v. All My Sons Mov-
ing & Storage, 2008 UT App 462U, para. 7 (mem.) 
("When a party fails to appear, the trial court may award 
attorney fees under its authority to control proceedings 
before it."); see also Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 
39, H 22 n.15, 214 P.3d 859. Instead, the trial court fol-
lowed a more rigorous course. Having done so, Walker 
contends, the court erred 1*5] in later denying relief 
from the judgment ordered at that hearing. 
2 Because we decline to reach the merits of 
Walker's claim that the summary judgment mo-
tion was not properly noticed, we assume for 
purposes of this appeal that it was. 
Essentially, Walker is claiming excusable neglect. 
The trial court has wide latitude in determining whether a 
party's neglect was excusable: 
[I]n deciding whether a party is entitled 
to relief under rule 60(b) on the ground of 
excusable neglect, a district court must 
determine whether the moving party has 
exercised sufficient diligence that it would 
be equitable to grant him relief from the 
judgment entered as a result of his ne-
glect. In making this determination, the 
district court is free to consider all rele-
vant factors and give each factor the 
weight that it determines it deserves. 
Jones, 2009 UT 39, U 25, 214 P.3d 859. In denying the 
rule 60(b) motion, the trial court here explained in detail 
the basis for its finding that Walker's counsel had not 
exercised "due diligence" in attempting to continue or 
attend the hearing. Those facts are set out in the court's 
lengthy minute entry and we do not repeat them here. 3 
We conclude on this record that the court acted within 
|*6] its broad discretion in denying Walker's rule 60(b) 
motion despite counsel's nonappearance at the summary 
judgment motion hearing. 
3 We recognize that the trial court addressed 
this issue in the context of the motion for sum-
mary judgment filed by Bolinder, heard at the 
same hearing as the summary judgment motion 
filed by Christensen. In so doing, the court fol-
lowed Walker's lead. Walker's rule 60(b) motion 
did not argue that his failure to appear and argue 
the Christensen motion was more excusable than 
his failure to appear and argue the Bolinder mo-
tion in the same hearing. He did argue that the 
absence of Christensen's counsel was a reason to 
grant Walker relief from the summary judgment 
in Christensen's favor. We find this argument un-
persuasive. 
Finally, Walker argues that the trial court erred in 
denying rule 60(b) relief because genuine issues of mate-
rial fact precluded summary judgment. However, Walker 
is appealing the court's denial of his rule 60(b) motion. 
Accordingly, we are reviewing the order denying the rule 
60(b) motion, not the underlying order granting summary 
judgment: 
"An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order ad-
dresses only the propriety of the denial or 
grant of relief. The appeal [*7] does not, 
at least in most cases, reach the merits of 
the underlying judgment from which re-
lief was sought. Appellate review of Rule 
60(b) orders must be narrowed in this 
manner lest Rule 60(b) become a substi-
tute for timely appeals. An inquiry into 
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the merits of the underlying judgment or 
order must be the subject of a direct ap-
peal from that judgment or order." 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT 
App 110, H 19, 2 P.3d 451 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 
60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999)). Accordingly, Walker's chal-
lenge to "the underlying judgment from which relief was 
sought," id., is not well taken. 
Affirmed. 
J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Associate Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
